Case Law » Civil Law
Civil Cases
Brandywine Smyrna, Inc. and BCP Smyrna, Inc. v. Millennium Builders, LLC., 2011 WL 6130804 (Del.)
The Delaware Supreme Court reversed and remanded the trial court’s decision denying entitlement to prejudgment interest to plaintiffs, after a jury award in plaintiff’s favor. The Court found that plaintiffs were not entitled to prejudgment interest on their tort claims pursuant to 6 Del. C. § 2301(d) because plaintiffs’ settlement offer exceeded the total damages awarded by the jury. This ruling was not dispositive, however, because the jury awarded plaintiffs damages on both its tort and contract claims, without reference to what portion of the damage award was attributable to each respective theories of recovery. Therefore, the Court found plaintiffs were entitled to recover prejudgment interest based upon Delaware case precedent awarding such interest as a matter of right for claims arising in contract. The Court disagreed with the trial court that plaintiffs were not entitled to prejudgment interest because the jury’s award of “additional interest expenses” constituted an award of prejudgment interest. The Court held the jury’s interest award represented an element of damages incurred by plaintiffs upon which plaintiffs are entitled to receive prejudgment interest. The Court remanded the case to the trial court, to determine the amount of prejudgment interest due to plaintiffs.
Smith v. Christina School District, 2011 WL 5924393 (Del. Super.).
The Delaware Superior Court denied defendant, Christina School District’s Motion for Summary Judgment. Parent brought suit on behalf of a minor plaintiff alleging that defendant and its staff were negligent in their supervision of plaintiff. Plaintiff suffered an injury to his finger while riding a tricycle at school. Defendant argued it was immune from suit under the Tort Claims Act. The Court explained that defendant, as a public school district, has immunity from liability under the Act. In order to overcome the immunity, plaintiff must show that the state waived the defense of sovereign immunity for the actions mentioned in the complaint and that the Act does not bar the action. The Court found that defendant waived sovereign immunity because it had insurance. However, plaintiff was also required to establish the absence of the following elements under the Act: the action was discretionary in nature, the action was done in good faith and the action was done without gross or wanton negligence. Although plaintiff’s complaint only alleged ordinary negligence, the Court denied summary judgment because the record established during discovery created a genuine issue of fact as to whether defendant’s acts were discretionary, done in good faith and done without gross and wanton negligence.
Pfieffer v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., et al., Del. Super., C.A. No. N10C-12-006 JRS, December 20, 2011.
The Superior Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Common Pleas granting defendants’ motions for summary judgment. This was a case of mistaken identity. After obtaining a default judgment against plaintiff, defendants pursued a suspension of her license. Defendants later discovered they had suspended the incorrect individual’s license and immediately took steps to remedy the situation. Plaintiffs filed suit in the Court of Common Pleas alleging defendants committed abuse of process and malicious prosecution when they mistakenly suspended plaintiff’s license in an attempt to recover a judgment. The Court agreed with the lower court’s finding that the facts did not support plaintiffs’ claims, as there was no evidence that the defendants acted with the required malice, improper motive or wanton disregard for the rights of plaintiffs.
Sinnott v. Thompson, 2011 WL 5569447 (Del.).
In this choice of law decision, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s denial of defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The case arose from a single-vehicle accident caused by a Delaware resident in North Carolina, while operating a motor vehicle registered in Delaware. Plaintiffs’ Complaint asserted a claim for personal injuries against the driver and negligent entrustment against the vehicle’s owner. The Court held that Delaware law applied to both causes of action. As to the personal injury claim, although the accident occurred in North Carolina, the Court found North Carolina’s doctrine of contributory negligence (which functions as a complete bar to recovery in negligence actions) repugnant to the settled public policy of Delaware. The Court also found that Delaware law applied to the negligent entrustment claim reasoning that the initial entrustment of the vehicle, which led to the operation of the vehicle in North Carolina, occurred in Delaware.
Cash v. East Coast Property Management, Inc., 7 A.3d 484 (Del. 2010)
The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant. This case arose from a slip and fall on ice at an apartment complex. The Court found that the evidence did not support plaintiff’s claim that the ice on the sidewalk formed from a previous storm, melted and re-froze, where there was no precipitation during the time frame alleged, temperature was well above the freezing point on the day before the accident and plaintiff admitted she did not see any snow or ice. Further, Court found that the continuous storm doctrine applied and no duty was voluntarily assumed where defendant had a policy of removing snow and ice during a storm.
Sewell v. Hertrich Investments LTD, Civ. No. 09-988, District of Delaware
(November 30, 2011)
Plaintiff filed suit against Defendant alleging employment discrimination under Title VII, § 1981, and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Plaintiff was Jamaican and had a hearing disability, however he was terminated from his employment for alleged theft of company property. Plaintiff claimed that he suffered disparate treatment from supervisors and a hostile work environment under Title VII and § 1981 and the ADA on the basis of his race, nationality and disability. Defendant moved for Summary Judgment, and the Court dismissed the Plaintiff’s claims of disparate impact regarding the termination, and all claims of racial discrimination. The only remaining issues for trial were whether the Plaintiff’s supervisors had harassed Plaintiff because of his nationality or his disability.
Following a jury trial , a verdict was rendered in favor of Defendant on each of the remaining issues, finding that no harassment had occurred. The jury had the opportunity to consider Plaintiff’s credibility in light of several similar complaints of discrimination made against prior employers, and through comparison of the testimony of Plaintiff’s former supervisors.
Wade v. Harvey, Del. Super., C.A. No. 07C-08-091, Herlihy, J. (October 4, 2011)
After a defense verdict, plaintiff moved for a new trial. The case arose from an intersectional accident in which both parties alleged that the other disregarded a red traffic light. The jury found the defendant negligent but that his negligence was not the proximate cause of the accident. The plaintiff argued that the verdict was inconsistent because the only explanation of what happened was that the accident resulted from defendant’s negligence. Defendant argued that the verdict was consistent with the evidence at trial and reflected the plaintiff’s comparative negligence. The court upheld the jury’s verdict finding that it was not against the great weight of the evidence or inconsistent. The court noted that the jury could have discredited the plaintiff’s testimony regarding the color of her light. Specifically, the court pointed out the plaintiff’s credibility issues, including receiving Percocet from two different doctors at the same time, neglecting to tell her treating physician about a prior accident/injury, and her statements about not being injured in a prior accident.
Brown v. Dover Downs, Inc., 2011 WL 3907536 (Del. Super.)
Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that it did not owe any duty to plaintiff. This case arose from a slip and fall which occurred in the bathroom of defendant’s hotel. Plaintiff claimed the defendant owed a duty to provide a bathmat in the shower stall in which she slipped and fell. As a matter of first impression, the court found no such duty existed as the potential danger of slipping while in the shower or bathtub was open and obvious. Further, the court found that defendant’s policy of providing bathmats did not give rise to a voluntary assumption of a heightened duty in tort.
McLarthy v. Hopkins, 2011 WL 3055252 (Del.).
In this case, McLarthy sought to invalidate a general release of all liability claims against Hopkins, contending that she was induced to sign the release by the insurance adjuster’s material misrepresentation. McLarthy was involved in a motor vehicle collision caused by Hopkins; both parties were insured by the same insurance carrier. The alleged misrepresentation occurred when the liability insurance adjuster told McLarthy that she would not have to worry about her medical bills being paid, as they would be covered by her personal injury protection coverage (PIP). In turn, McLarthy settled her liability claim for $750 and signed the general release at issue. McLarthy argued that the liability adjuster made a misrepresentation, which voided the release, because her PIP coverage might not have covered all her medicals bills. In fact, appellant’s medical bills were all paid by PIP. The Supreme Court held that McLarthy’s appeal was without merit, as she failed to establish that the insurance adjuster made a material misrepresentation. The Court reasoned that the insurance adjuster made no promises or guarantees to McLarthy, and that the liability adjuster had no authority to settle McLarthy’s PIP claim. Further, the Court found that even if the adjuster made a guarantee regarding PIP paying McLarthy’s medical bills, the statement accurately represented the ultimate actions of the insurance company, as McLarthy’s medical bills were paid by PIP.
Clariant Corporation v. The Hartford Mutual Insurance Company and Mill-Pond Properties, Inc., 2011 WL 18351 (Del. Supr.).
In this appeal, the Supreme Court was charged with determining whether, under the terms of a release, a tenant was obligated to continue to defend a third-party tort claim brought against a landlord. The landlord initially brought a declaratory judgment against the tenant, requesting a judicial determination of whether, under the terms of the lease agreement, tenant was obligated to provide a defense to third-party tort claims brought against the landlord. The parties settled the initial action and a release was executed. After the release was signed, the tenant continued to provide a defense to the landlord. Subsequently, plaintiff in the tort action amended his complaint, to include claims which the tenant believed they were not required to defend against. In response, the landlord filed a second declaratory judgment, seeking a ruling that the tenant was required to continue to provide a defense.
The lower Court held that the tenant did have a duty to continue to defend the landlord, finding the terms of the release were ambiguous because the release did not directly address the tenant's duty to defend tort claims brought against the landlord. The Supreme Court affirmed, but for different reasons. The Supreme Court found the release clearly extinguished the tenant's duty to defend, but found the parties to the agreement were mutually mistaken as to the effect of that release. This mutual mistake was evidenced by the tenant's action of continuing to provide a defense to the landlord, after the release was signed. Therefore, the parties effectively reformed the terms of the release, obligating the tenant to continue to provide a defense.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Patterson, 7 A.3d 454 (Del. Supr. 2010)
This action involved a dispute over Delaware uninsured motorist (UM) benefits. Aneita Patterson is a Delaware resident that was injured while driving her automobile in New Jersey. The accident was the fault of a New Jersey resident, Jean Armstrong. Patterson filed a claim against Armstrong’s insurance carrier, Allstate. Allstate denied the claim because it did not believe that Patterson had pierced the “verbal threshold” under the New Jersey Verbal Tort Threshold Statute, which limits tort-based recovery in New Jersey. Patterson then brought this action for UM benefits against her Delaware insurance carrier, State Farm. State Farm moved for summary judgment on the ground that Patterson was not legally entitled to recover from Armstrong under New Jersey law and, therefore, was not eligible to receive UM benefits under the State Farm policy. The Superior Court determined that Delaware law applied and Patterson could recover UM benefits to the extent that she could prove fault and damages. Therefore, it denied State Farm’s motion for summary judgment and compensatory damages were awarded to Patterson.
On appeal, State Farm argued that the Superior Court erred as a matter of law in concluding that Patterson was “legally entitled to recover” against the tortfeasor under title 18, section 3902(a) of the Delaware Code. There was no dispute that if Delaware law applied, Patterson was entitled to recover damages which the New Jersey Statute disallowed. Although a claim for insurance policy benefits arises out of contract, the Court noted that tort law governs the assessment of the underlying damages. Therefore, the issue was which law, Delaware or New Jersey, should be applied to determine whether Patterson was legally entitled to recover the underlying damages. Using the “most significant relationship” test set forth in Section 145(1) of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, the Supreme Court held that Delaware had a more significant relationship to the occurrence and parties. Accordingly, the Superior Court decision was affirmed.
