Case Law » Workers' Compensation Law
Attorney's Fees / Huffman Penalties
Wayne Dill v. First State Construction, IAB Hearing No. 1314167 (March 4, 2011) (Order)
Employer filed a Petition for Review seeking to terminate Claimant’s temporary total disability benefits. After presenting several medical and vocational witnesses through prior deposition testimony, Employer’s counsel notified the Board that Claimant, who was present in the hearing room, was not the subject of surveillance video upon which Employer intended to rely to establish an improvement in Claimant’s work capabilities. Accordingly, Employer moved to withdraw the Petition. Claimant’s counsel acknowledged that he was aware, probably prior to the depositions of Employer’s medical witnesses, that the surveillance video depicted the wrong person. However, he insisted that he had no duty to notify opposing counsel of the error. The Board allowed Employer to withdraw the Petition, over Claimant’s objection. The Board held that, pursuant to Lattis v. Blackwell and Son, Inc., 1992 WL 53435 (Del. Feb. 28, 1992), Claimant was entitled to an attorney’s fee award for time spent defending against a withdrawn termination petition. However, it awarded a nominal attorney’s fee of $100, noting that Claimant’s counsel’s failure to disclose the surveillance video error prevented good faith settlement negotiations prior to the hearing; wasted administrative resources; and amounted to impermissible "trial by surprise."
Pugh v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 945 A.2d 588 (Del. 2008)
Pugh, the Claimant in this matter, was awarded $1,200 in disability benefits the day before the scheduled hearing. Wal-Mart agreed that Pugh was entitled to an attorney's fees, but the parties disagreed on the amount. They presented their arguments to the Board, which awarded Pugh $400 in attorney's fees. Pugh appealed. The Superior Court held on appeal that 19 Del. C. § 2320(10)(a) authorized the Board to award attorneys' fees to a claimant who prevails through a settlement rather than a Board determination. It was also held that the Board did not abuse its discretion in awarding the $400 in attorneys' fees based on the $1,200 in disability payments because the Delaware law does not require the Board to value non-monetary benefits and include that value in its fee calculation.
Turner v. City of Wilmington, Del. Supr., No. 480, 2006, Ridgley, J. (Mar. 12, 2007)
In Turner, the plantiff employee filed a civil action against the City of Wilmington claiming liquidated damages, attorney fees and costs under the Wage Payment and Collection Act on the basis of the City's delay in payment of worker's compensation benefits. While the City of Wilmington had paid medical benefits, Turner brought the action on the basis that the City of Wilmington was subject to liquidated damages, fees and costs under the Supreme Court decision in Huffman v. C.C. Oliphant & Sons, Inc., 432 A.2d 1207 (Del.1981). In Huffman, the Court granted recovery of damages for wrongfully withheld benefits, pursuyant to the Wage Payment and Collection Act. However, the Court in Turner rejected plaintiff's claim because the State of Delaware and its political subdivisions enjoy statutory immunity from WPCA remedies. The Court reasoned that the General Assembly has decided as a matter of public policy that political subdivisions should be exempt from claims under the WPCA.
