CIVIL LAW
EVIDENCE
Davis v. Maute, 770 A.2d 36 (Del. 2001), Veasey, C.J.
This case involved a negligence action to recover for soft tissue back, neck, and rib injuries allegedly suffered in an automobile collision for which the defendant conceded liability. Defense counsel argued that the collision amounted to a “fender-bender” and argued for the admissibility of photographs of the damaged vehicle, both without the support of expert testimony, to minimize personal injury damages because the damage to the vehicle was minor. The Delaware Supreme Court held that absent expert testimony, both medical and biomechanical, correlating seriousness of injuries to seriousness of property damage, defense counsel’s characterization of “fender-bender” was improper. Additionally, the Court held that the admission of photographs showing the degree of damage to a party’s vehicle to support the degree of injury was also improper.
Eskin v. Carden, 842 A.2d 1222 (Del. 2004), Steele, J.
The Delaware Supreme Court considered the admissibility of biomechanical evidence and photographs in minor impact cases. The court addressed for the first time whether biomechanical expert testimony may be admitted in Delaware courts to address the relationship between the physical forces involved in an automobile accident and the cause and severity of an occupant's alleged injuries. The court held “that trial judges may admit qualified biomechanical expert testimony regarding the physical forces involved in automobile accidents and the effect on the human body those forces may produce where the relevance, reliability and trustworthiness of that testimony is established by the proffer and is not outweighed by the danger of confusion of the issues or misleading the jury.”
INSURANCE LAW
Deptula v. Horace Mann Insurance Co., 842 A.2d 1235 (Del. 2004), Berger, J.
This case addressed UIM stacking. The Delaware Supreme Court held that the stacking of coverage provided by multiple automobile insurance policies is permitted once the statutory threshold for UIM coverage has been satisfied by any one policy. The court found that nothing in the UIM statute prohibits stacking, and that stacking enables innocent claimants to be more fully compensated for their injuries.
Redding v. Ortega, 840 A.2d 1224 (Del. 2003), Holland, J.
This case addressed whether an uninsured plaintiff can admit into evidence medical expenses that would have been PIP-eligible if an insurance company had existed. The Delaware Supreme Court held that a motorist and passenger, who were not covered by any Delaware automobile insurance policies, were not eligible for PIP benefits under the Delaware no-fault insurance statute, and, thus, were not precluded under 21 Del. C. 2118 from introducing evidence of medical expenses in the action against the alleged tortfeasor.
Dunlap v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., Del. Super., C.A. No. 03C-12-168, Ableman, J. (June 15, 2004) 2004 WL 1427001.
The Superior Court determined that a UIM insurer did not in bad faith refuse to approve its insureds' proposed settlement with the Delaware Transit Corp., because the insureds' underinsured motorist coverage had not yet ripened. The court found that plaintiffs' negotiations for a potential settlement, “which they chose not to accept, and the subsequent trial that ensued, represented an unresolved, outstanding, bodily injury liability insurance policy claim 'available' to the plaintiffs that was yet to be 'exhausted.' Therefore, defendant was not obligated to make a payment pursuant to the UIM coverage provided by plaintiffs' policy because the UIM claim had not ripened, and such payment would violate the statute.”
Rosenthalis v. Doctors for Emergency Services, Del. Super., C.A. No. 99C-09-217, Silverman, J. (Mar. 30, 2004) 2004 WL 692686.
A case of first impression, the Superior Court found that the $300,000 cap specified in the Delaware Insurance Guaranty Association Act applies on a “per claimant” rather than a “per incident” basis.
Kent v. Nationwide Property & Casualty Insurance Co., 844 A.2d 1092 (Del. Super. 2004), Del Pesco, J.
A Delaware resident, who was injured in an automobile accident that occurred in New Jersey and involved a New Jersey resident, sought to recover from her automobile insurer for non-economic damages, under the uninsured motorist provisions of the policy. The Superior Court determined that injured Delawareans could seek recovery from their uninsured motorist policies when another state's insurance statute exempts resident drivers from liability for non-economic damages.
WORKERS COMPENSATION LAW
Course & Scope of Employment
Don Lee Margin v. Adkins, Del. Super., C.A. No. 00A-11-006, Silverman, J. (July 31, 2001),
In this case, the claimant hurt her shoulder in her home while attempting to remove her shirt before taking a shower. Her work activities consisted of lifting tubes of spun nylon that weighed 10-20 pounds. Medical experts on both sides of the case agreed that the event in the claimant’s home was not, by itself, sufficient to produce the claimant’s rotator cuff tendinitis. The Court held that the injury was caused by the cumulative detrimental effect of the employee’s work activity, regardless of where the injury manifests itself, and found the injury compensable.
E.I. Dupont DeNemours & Co. v. Faupel, Del. Super., C.A. No. 03A-04-014, Cooch, J. (Nov. 3, 2003),
An employee received a flu vaccination at work, which was funded by the employer and administered to its employees at its facilities. Approximately one week later, the employee became ill and was diagnosed with chronic inflammatory polyneuropathy. The Superior Court affirmed the IAB’s ruling that the flu shot was given within the course and scope of employment, and was compensable. The Court noted that the program was not open to the public, and notices were sent to employees strongly urging participation, which demonstrated a mutual benefit in the form of lessened absenteeism and improved employer relations.
Enna v. Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom, IAB Hearing No. 1243136 (5/3/04),
An associate attorney at a law firm who was struck by a vehicle while engaged in a mid-day walk was deemed outside the course and scope of his employment. The Board rejected the argument that the employee had a semi-fixed place of employment, and held that the walk was not reasonably related to business activity.
Attorney's Fee/Huffman
Turner v. City of Wilmington, Del. Supr., No. 480, 2006, Ridgley, J. (Mar. 12, 2007), In Turner, the plantiff employee filed a civil action against the City of Wilmington claiming liquidated damages, attorney fees and costs under the Wage Payment and Collection Act on the basis of the City's delay in payment of worker's compensation benefits. While the City of Wilmington had paid medical benefits, Turner brought the action on the basis that the City of Wilmington was subject to liquidated damages, fees and costs under the Supreme Court decision in Huffman v. C.C. Oliphant & Sons, Inc., 432 A.2d 1207 (Del.1981). In Huffman, the Court granted recovery of damages for wrongfully withheld benefits, pursuyant to the Wage Payment and Collection Act. However, the Court in Turner rejected plaintiff's claim because the State of Delaware and its political subdivisions enjoy statutory immunity from WPCA remedies. The Court reasoned that the General Assembly has decided as a matter of public policy that political subdivisions should be exempt from claims under the WPCA.
Causation
Meloni v. General Motors Corp., IAB Hearing No. 1243684 (6/25/04),
This case includes a comprehensive discussion of the standard of causation for cumulative detrimental effect injuries. The Claimant must prove that the ordinary “stress and strain” of employment formed the substantial cause of his workers’ compensation claim. That ordinary “stress and strain” must exist as a direct cause to the basis of the claim without which the injuries would not have occurred.
Benacchio v. State of Delaware, IAB Hearing No. 1241882 (9/28/04),
This was a termination petition, in which the compensable injury involved a fracture to the foot as a result of a trip and fall. At the time of the termination hearing, the Claimant developed knee problems which rendered her disabled. The issue was whether the knee problems were causally related to the work event. Undisputedly, the Claimant had bilateral osteoarthritis in her knees which had reached the “end stage” prior to the work event. Both doctors agreed that the claimant’s subjective knee symptoms had increased since the trip and fall, although there were no objective diagnostic testing changes. Relying on Hines v. Delaware Recyclable Products, 2003 Del. Super. LEXIS 340, the Board found that because the Claimant could work prior to the work incident and could not work after it, the work incident aggravated her “overt pre-existing disease”, making the aggravation compensable.
Blake v. State of Delaware, Del. Supr., No. 477, 2001, Veasy, C.J., (Mar. 12, 2002)(Or.),
The Court held that a doctor’s testimony that he was satisfied to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that a work accident accelerated the claimant’s injury and his need for surgery, was sufficient evidence for the Board to infer that the accident proximately caused the surgery. The proper standard, correctly applied by the Board, is whether the surgery would have been required at that time but for the accident.
Gilliard Belfast v. Wendy’s, Inc., 754 A.2d 251 (Del. 2000),
The Supreme Court held that the IAB’s decision to deny claimant, who was ordered by her treating physician not to work prior to a compensable second operation, compensation for total disability while she waited for second operation was contrary to law. In addition, the Court held that a claimant who can only resume some form of employment by disobeying the orders of his treating physician is totally disabled, at least temporarily, regardless of his capabilities.
Displaced Worker
Timmon v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., IAB Hearing No. 1241867 (4/7/04),
The Board found that a 70 year old Claimant with an eleventh grade education and work history limited to manual labor to be a displaced worker where she is only capable of sedentary work. Claimant was capable of reading, writing and basic math, but had no prior experience in customer service, public relations or operation of a cash register.
Medical Testimony
Bullock v. Peoples Settlement Association, IAB Hearing No. 1169285 (10/1/03),
Where the defense medical evaluation upon which the carrier’s expert testifies is more than seven months old at the time of the Hearing, the treating physician’s opinion is adopted as more credible.
Medical Treatment
Faulkner v. M. Davis & Sons, IAB Hearing No. 1222054 (4/5/04),
Where the Claimant has a compensable injury to the spine and is referred to a neurologist to rule out a brain lesion as a cause for neck pain, the neurologic consult is compensable. The Board did note that any other testing of the brain after the initial consult would not be related.
Marden v. MBNA, IAB Hearing No. 1232004 (9/25/03),
The Board held that payment of some medical bills prior to formally denying a claim does not create an estoppel in terms of continued defense.
Vaugh v. Ferraly Industries, IAB Hearing No. 1053157 (5/19/04),
The reasonableness of medical treatment does not hinge on whether the treatment was indeed successful. In this case the claimant underwent acupuncture treatment for six weeks when it was determined that it was not providing any relief.
Partial Disability
Haskins v. A.I. DuPont Hospital, IAB Hearing No. 1158586 (10/20/03),
A voluntary retirement will not foreclose continued entitlement to partial disability if Claimant did not intend to remove herself entirely from the job market. In this case, the claimant put forth ample evidence of her post-retirement business plans, the foundation of which was set in motion prior to the work event.
Permanent Impairment
Matthews v. DaimlerChrysler, IAB Hearing No. 1132577 (8/30/04),
A period of one year should pass after an injury or surgery to allow for maximum healing in terms of recovery for permanent impairment.
Short v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, IAB Hearing No. 1141957 (10/21/04),
Permanent impairment benefits were denied where the claimant had previously been awarded a 15% impairment to the left upper extremity, and sought an additional 9% impairment due to a proposed third surgery. The surgery had not yet been performed at the time of the hearing. The Board denied benefits as premature.
Berry v. Racer’s Edge Stables, Inc., IAB Hearing No. 1199854 (5/18/04),
The Board deems a claim of permanent impairment to the bladder to be premature. Both medical experts concurred that the treatment modalities existed that could benefit Claimant and since she indicated a desire to undergo such treatment, the Board stated that it was premature to know what rating the Board might afford from the results of a surgery that has not yet been performed.
Statute of Limitations
General Motors Corp. v. Parker, Del. Super., C.A. No. 98A-09-008, Herlihy, J. (Sept. 1, 1999) (Mem. Op.),
The Superior Court held that where the claimant was originally allowed to present a compensable claim to her neck, the two-year statute of limitations did not bar that claimant from bringing another petition regarding an alleged shoulder injury as a result of the same work accident, on the basis that the injury was a result of a cumulative detrimental affect.
Fleming v. Purdue farms, Inc., Del. Super., C.A. No. 02A-02-009, Stokes, J. (Oct. 30, 2002),
The Superior Court held that pursuant to 18 Del. C. 3914, a worker’s compensation insurer is required to give written notice of the applicable statute of limitations during the pendency of a claim.